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Presented at the 1998 meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston, MA).From the text of the President’s speech at a Democratic National Committee fund-raiser
1
on September 26, 1997 (“Remarks by the President at the DNC Dinner” at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov).
For example, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt urged, “...let’s amend the
2
Constitution to honor ... the Founders ,”at the National Press Club on January 30, 1997 (“Ending
the Money Chase...” at www.house.gov/democrats/speeches/reform1.html).
However, legal scholars [e.g., Bevier (1997) and Johnson and Beard (1997)] and
3
journalists [e.g., Will (1996) and Rauch (1997)] have addressed the impact of campaign
regulation on the exercise of free speech and free association.
The Political Economics of Campaign Finance:
Lessons for Reform
Jeffrey Milyo
“I personally don’t think it’s a bad thing for a person who has done well in this country and
believes in politics and wants to contribute something back, to be able to do that.  I think it is a
good thing you’re doing here tonight, not a bad thing, and I’m proud of you for doing it.”
— President William Clinton
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1.  Introduction
The public debate over campaign finance reform is often framed as necessitating an
unfortunate tradeoff between the liberal ideals of free speech and association on one side, and the
democratic ideals of equal representation and participation on the other.  However, despite
frequent calls for dramatic action , the terms of this tradeoff are not well-understood.  This is in
2
part attributable to the fact that the study of the political economics of campaign finance is
perhaps more notable for its faults and oversights than its contributions.  For example, I know of
no political economic analysis of the effects of campaign finance regulations on freedom of speech
or association.   And while there is a plethora of work on how money affects either electoral or
3
policy outcomes, the quality of these studies is sometimes wanting.  However, recently there haveFor example, see Grier (1989), Levitt (1994), Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996b),
4
Erickson and Palfrey (1998), Gerber (1998) and Milyo (1998a).
For example, see Snyder (1990, 1992 and 1993), Grier and Munger (1991a,b), Grier,
5
Munger and Roberts (1994).
PAC contributions accounted for only about 15% of all Federal campaign contributions in
6
the 1995-1996 electoral cycle.
See Milyo (1998b) for a discussion on the degree to which campaign contributions are
7
interested;  see Lowenstein (1996) for a detailed discussion of the legal issues regarding bribery
and influence-peddling in politics.
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been important methodological advances in the empirical analysis of the electoral consequences of
campaign spending, although there is still no strong consensus on the importance of money in
elections.   Also, there are several admirable empirical studies of campaign contributions, but
4
these tend to focus on the allocation of funds by political action committees to Congressional
incumbents.   And while not unimportant, PAC contributions represent a small and declining share
5
of total campaign contributions.   Further, there is also no consensus in this literature as to
6
whether campaign contributions are the functional equivalent of bribes.   Finally, several relevant
7
insights from the theory of social choice have not been applied to the question of how campaign
finance affects the democratic process.  In this article, I primarily address this last point;  I argue
that contrary to the apocalyptic rhetoric of some reformers, interested money plays a less
deleterious role in American politics than is commonly held.  I conclude by proposing two very
simple and benign campaign finance reforms, inspired by the political economics of campaign
finance:  educate citizens about the realities of both campaign finance and democracy, and
encourage ordinary citizens to contribute more resources to candidates of their own choosing.This quote is from the text of one of the President’s weekly radio addresses to the nation
8
on September 13, 1997 (“Remarks by the President in Radio Address to the Nation” at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov).
Of course, politicians may advocate for reform as an exercise in demagoguery or even
9
cognitive dissonance (lamentations about the corrupting influence of money are often heard from
dis-empowered politicians:  those recently retired or defeated, those soon to be so, and those on
the losing side of some particular vote).
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2.  The Conventional Wisdom
“The campaign system is broken.”
— President William Clinton
8
The corrupting influence of money in politics is a staple of media pundits, public-interest
advocates, and even many politicians.   The basic claim is that interested money perverts the
9
democratic process in three ways: 1)  campaign contributions buy legislative favors, 2)  campaign
expenditures buy elective office and 3) popular disgust with the dominant role of money in politics
causes “ordinary” citizens to withdraw from participation in the political process.  Consequently,
the current system of campaign finance is thought to undermine the twin democratic principles of
representation and participation.
 Indeed, it is not difficult to find lurid examples and descriptive statistics that are
consistent with the claim that money is the driving force in American politics [e.g., Stern
(1991,1992), Morris and Gamache (1994), Makinson and Goldstein (1996)].  For example, it is
most often the case that in any electoral contest the candidate who spends more money wins. 
Further, when incumbent office-holders run for re-election, they usually spend far more than their
challengers and they usually win re-election easily.  It is also the case that PAC contributions flow
disproportionately to incumbents and that these same incumbents often vote in ways that areMilyo (1998a,b) makes this argument at length.
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Corroborating evidence is found in studies which demonstrate that neither campaign war
11
chests nor candidate wealth deter challengers [Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996a) and Milyo and
Groseclose (1998)].  Also, consider the following quotes from President Clinton on the efficacy of
campaign spending:
4
pleasing to the sponsors of their donor PACs.  This fund-raising advantage of incumbents is
compounded by the fact that the absence of serious competition permits many incumbents to build
up large stockpiles of unspent campaign funds.  To the extent these war chests deter future
challengers, the incumbent is more securely entrenched in office.  Finally, it is also true that
turnout in elections has been generally decreasing and  that campaign spending has been generally
increasing.  Nevertheless, more sophisticated and systematic evidence tends not to corroborate
the conventional wisdom.
Empirical Studies of Campaign Finance
The conventional wisdom on the role of money in politics stands in disturbing contrast to
the findings of most academic research on the topic (to the great frustration of those of us doing
the research!).  In short, most academic experts would agree that it is very difficult to find
consistent and convincing evidence that interested money buys either elections or policy favors
[e.g., Sorauf (1992) and Levitt (1995)].
One important implication of recent empirical research on campaign finance is that the
marginal value of a campaign contribution is quite small, both to the recipient and to the donor.  
10
This is because current law limits the size and source of contributions and because marginal
campaign spending appears to have little effect on electoral outcomes [Levitt (1994), and Milyo
(1997b and 1998a)].   It is therefore not surprising that there is little evidence that PAC
11...all of us who have run in elections know that there is a core, a threshold amount
of money you have to have to make sure your voice is heard.  After that, if
somebody’s got a little more, it’s not important [from the text of a press
conference on May 7, 1993 (“Statement by the President, ...” at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov)].
I was asking the students ... How many people have you voted for because you
thought they had the best television ads?  How many people have you voted
against because you saw a negative campaign ad (?)... and they all started laughing
as we rocked along, you know [from the text of comments made at a fund-raising
dinner on September 26, 1997 (“Remarks by the President at the DNC Dinner,” at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov)].
Hall and Wayman (1990) argue that interested money may influence the activities of
12
legislators in more subtle ways (bill sponsorship, bill content, etc.), but neither Wawro (1997) nor
Milyo (1998b) find much evidence for this claim.
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contributions influence the roll-call voting behavior of legislators [e.g., Bronars and Lott (1998)
and Levitt (1998)].   These findings are consistent with the fact that aggregate contributions to
12
Federal candidates and parties during the 1995-1996 electoral cycle were only about $2 billion
(Miller, 1997).  This is equivalent to about .02% of GDP, or roughly one-third of the amount of
money contributed to the United Way during that time period;  further, case studies of major
corporations suggest that the funds spent on charitable activities by major firms are an order of
magnitude larger than the total amount devoted to political activities by those firms, associated
PACs and their employees, combined (Milyo, 1998b).  Consequently, most political contributions
should be considered relatively uninterested money.
Soft Money
An important distinction must be made between campaign contributions to candidates and
PACs (which are limited by the Federal Election Campaign Act), and those to parties or issue-
advocacy campaigns (which are not currently limited).  Money raised in accordance with FederalFor a more detailed discussion of soft money, see Dwyre (1996).
13
Further, 93% of the total soft money contributed by corporations was donated in
14
amounts of less than $20,000.
6
contribution laws is known as “hard money”;  such contributions may be spent on any type of
political advertisement.  “Soft money” is any donation to a party or other group which does not
qualify (by either size or source) as hard money .  Soft money may be used to run generic issue-
13
advocacy advertisements, but not for advertisements which explicitly advocate voting for or
against a particular candidate.  Of course, these generic issue-advocacy activities are sometimes
close substitutes for campaign advertisements.  Consequently, soft money contributions have been
the target of numerous recent reform efforts (including the Shays-Meehan and McCain-Feingold
legislation currently pending in Congress).
Soft money contributions are more likely to be effective “bribes” than are direct campaign
contributions to individual legislators;  this is because soft money contributions are unlimited in
size and because political parties have various methods of disciplining their members and
delivering of political favors.  Despite this, soft money contributions to the two major national
parties were less than $275 million during the 1995-1996 electoral cycle, an amount equivalent to
15% of the hard money spent during that time period (www.fec.gov).
14
It is difficult to reconcile this relative dearth of soft money with the notion that such
contributions constitute effective bribes.  But it is consistent with the claim that most hard money
contributions are uninterested, and that the sheer volume of these contributions drives down the
marginal value of campaign contributions to the point where interested money has little
incremental value to politicians.  The reason so little interested money flows into politics is that itThis quote is from the text of a statement made to reporters introducing the President’s
15
proposal to reform campaign finance on May 7, 1993 (“Statement by the President, Vice
President, ...”at www.pub.whitehouse.gov).  
7
does not buy much in the way of legislative action.  However, an important caveat must be made
here:  it is simply not known how much money is spent on generic issue-advocacy campaigns, or
on more subtle attempts to manipulate popular opinion (e.g., the content of popular entertainment
programing).  Consequently, it is difficult to assess the degree to which interested money affects
American politics through this soft money “loop-hole.”
Nevertheless, there is good reason to doubt the popular understanding of the role of
money in politics.  But even if interested money plays an important role in American politics, it
does not follow that the basic principles of democracy are being ill-served.  This is because
interested money also has some salutary effects on majoritarian politics.
4.  Lessons from the Theory of Social Choice
“... restore democracy in our country...”
— Vice President Albert Gore
15
The most significant result of the last half century of social choice theory is the realization
that there is no collective decision rule which can always satisfy a reasonably minimal set of
“rationality” conditions (Arrow, 1963).  Further, given a collective of heterogeneous individuals,
there exist several different methods of aggregating their individual preferences into a collective
preference, each of which is arguably consistent with the democratic ideals of representation and
participation, but which produce different collective choices (e.g., Riker, 1982).
In this context, it is not obviously undesirable for interested money to produce deviationsThe most important exception is the familiar median voter result in a one dimensional
16
policy space.  Poole and Rosenthal (1985) have argued that Congressional politics is essentially
one-dimensional, which would imply that the existence of pure majority rule equilibria is more the
norm than the exception.  However, the interpretation of their evidence rests on very strong
assumptions on individual preferences [Koford (1989) and Milyo (1998c)].
8
from what would otherwise occur under simple majority rule.  First of all, pure  majority rule is
irrational, that is a pure majority rule equilibrium almost never exists (Plott, 1967).   Worse yet,
16
agenda setters are known to wield extreme influence over outcomes in majority rule settings
(McKelvey, 1976).  Finally in large elections, voters have little reason to vote responsibly
(Brennan and Lomasky, 1993).  It is therefore not a stretch to consider interested money to be a
check on the power of political agenda setters or the whims of a less interested and temporary
majority (Hayek, 1960).
What is Democracy?
In common parlance, democracy has come to mean simple majority rule.  Institutions
which hinder action by simple legislative majorities, whether they be internal to the legislature (the
filibuster, the committee system, party leadership, supermajority rules, etc) or external (executive
vetoes or judicial decrees) --- are often decried as “undemocratic.”  Under this definition, outside
pressure from special interests in the form of lobbying or campaigning is “undemocratic” since it
may cause the legislature to choose an outcome that it might not have otherwise.  However,
deviations from simple majoritarianism are widely accepted (even strongly preferred) in certain
venues.  For example, supermajority rules are used for altering the Constitution and for jury
decisions, while plurality rule is used to decide the outcomes of most elections.  This suggests that
the frequent equivalence of democracy and simple majority rule in common parlance is more the
product of imprecise language and intellectual laziness than it is evidence of a popular consensus9
for such a narrow understanding of what is democratic.
A more sensible definition of what is democratic would include any institutions which limit
the inevitable inequalities in representation and participation to some tolerable level.  Of course,
this more nebulous definition makes it impossible to objectively characterize institutions as
democratic or undemocratic.  Consequently, once we admit a more expansive understanding of
democracy, it becomes more difficult to maintain the position that the presence of interested
money in politics is necessarily undesirable.
Control of the Legislative Agenda
The intransitivity of pure majority rule is more than just a theoretical curiosity.  The
inherently chaotic tendencies of pure majority rule lead legislatures to adopt rules of procedure
which constrain legislative choice and empower agenda-setters.  Procedural rules typically limit
the feasible set available to the legislature, dictate the order of consideration of these feasible
options and restrict the mechanism of choice to a series of binary (yea, nay) votes.  The ability to
manipulate the content and ordering of the legislative agenda permits party leaders to wield
significant influence over the outcomes of legislative choice (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). 
However, free and open public debate can focus the attention of the electorate and raise the cost
of agenda manipulation.
For example, issues such as campaign finance reform, term limits and balanced budget
restrictions are typically far less popular among legislators than the general public.  Party leaders
often block such issues from even coming up for debate.  However, in many instances, special
interest groups have successfully raised public awareness and concern over these issues and
forced them onto the legislative agenda.  By allowing interested persons to lobby their10
representatives and fellow citizens, the power of agenda-setters is reduced.  At the same time,
new information and arguments are added to the public debate.  Of course, some misinformation
and illogic will also be produced.  But it is in no way self-evident that the social costs of issue
advocacy and lobbying outweigh the social benefits.
Representation of Intense Interests
Even if we ignore the pervasiveness of intransitivity, pure majoritarian institutions are
deeply flawed on normative grounds.  Simple majority rule is the most direct implementation of
the principle of “one person, one vote”, and while this principle is held in great esteem, its appeal
stems partly from the implicit assumption that all persons have an equal stake in the collective
outcome.  This is clearly not the case in what we might call “private” matters;  indeed a generic
right to privacy is so well accepted that few Americans would find that the existing Constitutional
guarantees of their individual liberties are “undemocratic.”  The great flaw in majoritarian
institutions is that each individual’s preference is weighted equally, even though there may be
tremendous heterogeneity in the intensity of individual preferences.
Supermajority requirements are one common method of accounting for the intensity of
individual preferences;  such rules permit the votes of an intense minority to outweigh those of the
unconcerned majority.  However, such rules may also permit an unconcerned minority to thwart
the desire of an intensely interested but insufficiently large majority.
A second method of incorporating intensity of preferences in the collective choice process
is to disproportionately weight the preferences of intense minorities.  The committee system in
Congress can be viewed as an attempt do this:  preference outliers select onto committees with
narrow policy jurisdictions, while the rules of the House and (to a lesser extent) the Senate permitHowever, see Groseclose (1994) and Krehbiel (1991).
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committee members disproportionate influence over legislation in their jurisdiction (Weingast and
Marshall, 1988).
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A third method of incorporating the intensity of interests is simply to permit deliberation
and debate.  By communicating their positions, intense interests can better inform the collective
about any disproportionate effects of policy, or, in the very least, appeal to the magnanimity of the
less intensely interested.  Since not all interests will be well represented in a given legislature, and
since effective persuasion may be quite costly, it is only to be expected that groups will form
around common interests and pool their resources for the purpose of influencing the decisions of
the legislature or the opinions of the citizenry at large.  Consequently, special interest lobbying
and issue advocacy activities serve a socially desirable function;  they permit at least some
minority interests to inform the collective about the intensity of their preferences.
A final method for incorporating information on the intensity of individual preferences into
the collective choice process is vote-trading.   Within legislatures, such exchanges are known as
log-rolls.  These vote-trades necessarily work to the advantage of the interests which are party to
the exchange, since these trades are made voluntarily.  Further, in majoritarian institutions, vote-
trading necessarily involves minority interests, since otherwise the majority would simply pass its
preferred legislation directly.  Consequently, through log-rolling, minority interests improve their
lot by “buying” legislation that is dear to them at the cost of supporting legislation which is
relatively unimportant to them (but dear to some other minority interest).  In this way,
majoritarian institutions can be made more responsive to minority interests.
An indirect form of vote trading occurs through campaigning and elections.  IntenseFor an in-depth review and critique of this literature, see Green and Shapiro (1994).
18
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interests provide support to candidates in exchange for political favors.  However, candidates who
cater only to special interests risk alienating large segments of the electorate.  Consequently,
candidates must expend resources to inform and persuade the electorate to their cause.  Thus,
candidates serve as arbiters, both between competing groups of intense special interests and
between intense special interests and the unconcerned majority.  If the interests of minority groups
are sufficiently intense, then they will provide enough support to candidates that those candidates
can then afford to ignore the interest of the majority on the issue in question.  Of course, it is easy
to envision contexts where such an outcome is either normatively appealing or appalling, but the
same is also true of pure majoritarianism.
Voter Participation
Rational choice theories of voter participation posit that individuals weigh the benefits of
voting against the costs.   The benefits of voting are the satisfaction of the act itself and the
18
expected change in the outcome of the election that results from one vote.  The costs of voting
are the time and effort it takes to actually cast a ballot; for example, registering to vote, becoming
informed about candidate positions, finding the appropriate polling place, and queuing to vote.  It
is well-known that in large elections the probability that a single vote will be decisive is essentially
nil, so the decision to vote becomes a simple weighing of the intrinsic value of the act against its
costs.
It is often claimed that public disgust with campaign finance is a reason for declining voterFor example, consider this observation from the noted political commentator for MTV,
19
Tabitha Soren, “Young people are alienated... young people think politics is rigged by money, and
they’re right,” [from the text of an interview of President Clinton aboard the MTV Choose of
Lose Bus on August 30, 1996 (“Interview of the President by Tabitha Soren of MTV,”at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov)].




participation.   The main evidence for this claim is the fact that campaign spending and turnout
19
have been moving in roughly the opposite direction over the last fifteen years.  This is consistent
with the claim, but far from convincing evidence of a causal relationship.
So, does campaign spending cause voter apathy by lowering the intrinsic value of voting? 
If so, we might expect that individuals with more cynical views on campaign finance, party
politics and government would be less likely to vote.  A recent poll of voters and non-voters
commissioned by the League of Women Voters suggests that this is not the case;  non-voters hold
views that are ver similar to those of voters.   The major difference found between voters and
20
non-voters is that the latter have a higher opportunity cost of their time and are less likely to feel a
strong duty to vote.  This is consistent with the rational choice theory of voting, but offers no
support for the claim that the prevalence of interested money in politics reduces voter
participation.
However, it is possible that interested money depresses turnout in a more indirect fashion. 
Since interested money flows primarily to incumbent office holders, the dramatic increase in
campaign spending may have reduced the competitiveness of elections and thereby lowered
turnout.  But this argument has two serious flaws.
First, Milyo (1997c) demonstrates that Congressional elections have actually become more14
competitive as campaign spending has jumped.  Despite an increase in real incumbent spending
and no change in the proportion of experienced challengers, House races have become closer,
incumbents have drawn down their war chests, defeats have increased and the proportion of
unopposed incumbents has dropped.  The turnover rate (defeats plus retirements as a share of
seats) for the House and Senate has averaged 20% since the 1990 redistricting; this is the highest
average turnover rate for any three consecutive elections in the last four decades.  This is not
surprising;  the increased competition for partisan control of Congress is surely one of the primary
causes of the steep upward trend in aggregate campaign spending.  Further, the failure of
increased competitiveness to cause a similar increase in the voter participation trend is consistent
with the prediction that the instrumental value of voting does not drive an individual’s decision to
vote.
The second flaw in this logic is the presumption that electoral competitiveness should
cause turnout in large scale elections.  It is true that empirical studies of elections repeatedly find
that turnout is significantly correlated with the closeness of the electoral race.  It is also true that
many rational choice theorists have interpreted this as evidence consistent with the rational choice
theory of voting:  the idea being that an individual’s vote is more likely to be decisive in a close
race.  However, in large elections, the probability of casting a decisive vote, even in a close
election, is still negligible.  Consequently, changes in the expected closeness of an election should
not have a significant and direct affect on turnout.
The observed correlation between turnout and closeness is not evidence of a proximate
causal relationship.  Rather, greater electoral competition causes increased spending, which in
turn causes increased turnout.  The link from electoral competitiveness to campaign spendingAnsolabehere and Iyengar (1995) argue that negative advertising reduces turnout, but
21
Finkel and Greer (1998) find no strong evidence for this association.  Further, I have been unable
to find any evidence that increased campaign spending leads to more negative advertising, despite
numerous assertions of to that effect by reform advocates (e.g., Kuttner, 1998).
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occurs for two reasons:  the expected closeness of the election increases the propensity of donors
to give to candidates (Milyo 1997a) and causes candidates to expend more effort on raising funds
(Milyo, 1998e).  The second link from spending to turnout is also quite intuitive.  Since campaign
spending is largely used to run campaign advertisements, it should be no surprise that voter
interest is peaked in districts that are bombarded with numerous advertisements.   In fact, voter
21
turnout is significantly related to campaign spending, even when controlling for the closeness of
the race (Milyo, 1998d).  Consequently, there is little support, in either theory or empirics, for the
claim that the presence of interested money in American elections is a cause of the general decline
in voter turnout.
4.  Conclusion
The public debate over campaign finance reform has taken as given the notion that
interested money corrupts democratic politics.  However, recent empirical studies suggest that
interested money does not play an extremely influential role in Federal elections.  More
importantly, the theory of social choice informs us that the net effect of interested money on the
democratic ideals of representation and participation is ambiguous.  This raises the burden of
reformers:  any cost-benefit analysis of campaign finance reform must consider not only the real
costs of regulation on free speech and association, but must also demonstrate a net positive effect
on democratic procedure.In a recent poll sponsored by the Citizens for Responsive Politics, only 12% of
22
respondents could correctly answer more than two out of five simple true-false questions on
campaign fiance (www.crp.org/s1/s2.htm).  For comparison, hamsters, pushing levers at random
corresponding to “true” or “false,” could be expected to demonstrate significantly more
knowledge about campaign finance based on their “answers” to similar questions.




Of course, there is no objective way to gauge the net effect of interested money on the
democratic process.  However, numerous opinion polls reveal that in the subjective evaluation of
most Americans, interested money does have an undesirable net effect on politics (Miller, 1997). 
Of course, part of this support for reform stems from ignorance.   After all, the insights from
22
recent empirical and theoretical studies are not often heard on the nightly news or seen in
newspaper editorials.  Consequently, one avenue of reform is simply to inform citizens that
interested money does not necessarily undermine democracy, either in theory, or practice.
If Americans nevertheless believe that interested money plays too great a role in their
politics, there is still an important lesson for reform here.  It has been argued that soft money
contributions (to parties and issue-advocacy campaigns) are the more likely pathway for
interested money to influence political outcomes.  The failure to index hard money contribution
limits for inflation means that these limits have been reduced by over 70% since their inception in
1974.  To the extent this has slowed the flow of money to candidates (from what it would have
been otherwise), it will have raised the marginal value of soft money and thereby increased the
influence of interested money in American politics.  Current reform efforts are aimed restricting
these activities, but such regulations will have consequences for free speech and association and
may not survive a Constitutional challenge.   However, a more promising approach is available.
23skeptics look at ... reform measures and ask whether ... there will be unintended
consequences.  The truth is that ... there will be unintended consequences. 
But...that’s what makes life interesting and keeps us all humble [from the text of a
speech made to the National Press Club on March 11, 1997 (“Remarks by the
President in Address to the Conference on Free TV and Political Reform,” at
www.pub.whitehouse.gov)].
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Since campaign contributions to candidates are relatively uninterested, it is possible to
drive down the marginal value of interested money to recipients by increasing the flow of hard
money to candidates.  This could be accomplished through subsidies, increasing and\or indexing
the current nominal hard money contribution limits, or simply through public interest
advertisements (akin to the ubiquitous “get out the vote” advertisements sponsored by various
groups).  This type of reform has no serious consequences for freedom of speech or association
because it avoids the need to define and monitor issue-advocacy, etc.  Further, by encouraging
more contributions, candidate spending will likely increase, which can be expected to lead to
higher rates of voter participation.
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